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Article 2

THE NATURAL LAW IN THE
RENAISSANCE PERIOD *

I
The Renaissance period is usually associated with the
Arts and with Literature; it is considered as a new birth
of the Greek and Roman classics but also as the discovery
of a new sense of life, as a period in which the autonomous
individual, as the person in a pronounced meaning, escapes
from the pre-eminence of the clergy and a morality determined by the Church. Nourished by the rediscovered philosophy of life of the classics, an emancipation takes place of
the man of the world, of the man of secular learning, and of
the artist and the poet, who set themselves up as of their
own right beside, not against, the secular clergy and the
learned monk. In politics this means the dissolution of the
medieval union of Church and Empire in favor of the now
fully developed nation-states and city-republics which stress
their autonomy against the Church as against the Empire.
While the Renaissance, thus conceived, was of tremendous
significance, it is nevertheless true that as such it contributed
little for the development of the theory of Natural Law. The
reason for this is that the Humanists were admirers of the
stoic philosophy and of the great orator, Cicero, the elegant
popularizer of stoic philosophy and of the philosophical ideas
of the Roman Law, which, at that time, freed from the Canon Law, conquered the world again. But for this reason the
philosophers of the Renaissance, in the customary meaning,
have little to contribute to our theme, since they are satisfied
with what they read and reread in their beloved ancients.
One could, of course, object that Machiavelli should here be
mentioned as the great sceptic of the idea of' the Natural
Law, as the man who first separated Politics and Ethics,
*Originally delivered as an address at the Second Annual Natural Law Institute,
College of Law, University of Notre Dame, December 11, 1948.
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who first was concerned with a political science free from
value-judgments, inter.ested only in the means, in the techniques of gaining and holding an in itself morally indifferent
Power in which he saw the only meaning of Politics. Yet
the spirit of the time did not permit him - just as a century
later, it did not permit Hobbes - to state openly his utter
contempt of the Natural Law.
When we speak of the Natural Law in the Renaissance
period, we must look elsewhere. We must turn our attention to another field, much neglected - the great revival
of the philosophy of the Natural Law in the second flowering of Scholasticism. This also was a Renaissance, namely
of the aristotelean-thomistic philosophy. As the other Renaissance had to overcome the empty subtleties of the Nominalists in their meaningless hairsplitting and their consequently crude Latin, so the second flowering of Scholasticism had to overcome the same decay of the scholastic
method and the philosophy of the via moderna. Just as the
one went back to the stoics as its great masters, so this other
Renaissance went back to St. Thomas. Yet it had to conduct its great controversies, at the same time, against the
Reformers, whose exclusive Supernaturalism led to a distrust
in philosophy, in natural reason, and to a hollowing out, as
a consequence, of the very substance of the Natural Law.
We are, therefore, justified if we restrict ourselves in the following discussion to that other Renaissance which alone has
contributed positively to the theory of Natural Law, by saving the idea of Natural Law from the stranglehold of Nominalism and by protecting it against the suffocating Supernaturalism of the Reformers.
The great line of Natural Law philosophers begins with
Vittoria, who introduced the Summa Theologica instead of
the sentences of Peter of Lombard as the basis of teaching
a practice which became general when St. Ignatius ordained that the professors of his order make the Summa the
basis of their studies and courses, and reaches to St. Robert
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Bellarmine. Though originating in the Iberian Peninsula,
and in its world famous universities, such as Salamanca the
Great, and Coimbra the Glorious, attended by students from
all nations, this second flowering of Scholasticism spread
through the whole of Christian civilization, as is proved
when one considers the publication places of the works of
Suarez, Soto, Lessius, Bellarmine, and Molina and their use
as texts in the leading universities of France, Italy, and Germany. For instance, the De Legibus of Suarez, the Masterwork in legal and political theory and in Natural Law, was
published in Coimbra, Cologne, Lyon, Antwerpen and Mayence.
While a Renaissance is at the same time a revival of a
great earlier period and an overcoming of a desolate period
before it, it must be more than a mere repetition to be pregnant of the future: it must be a new rethinking and broadening, a "vetera novis augere et perficere." Nominalism and
its consequence at least in part, the Reformation, constituted the dissolving desolate period in the theory of the Natural
Law: the development of what was implicit in St. Thomas,
and an enrichment of the theory of its application to the
problems of its time was its own everlasting contribution.
II
The idea of Natural Law finds its full meaning only if
certain fundamental verities are accepted; otherwise a cor.
rosive criticism all too easily produces that kind of cynical
relativism which we know in the philosophy of law as positivism. True, the Natural Law is so "engraved in the hearts
of men" that it cannot be wholly wiped out at any time in
all the people. Yet that corrosive criticism, first decomposing the idea of Natural Law in the minds of the legal profession and the Intellectuals, oozes down slowly into the
mind of the so-called common man and then produces the
loss of common moral principles and indubitable convictions
of what is justice, which finally leads to the assertion that
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the Bill of Rights is a propagandist trick of the Bourgeoise
mind to fool the Proletariat. If anywhere, then here, the
good and ever-valid rule "PNincipils obsta" should be followed. It is on account of this that the verities which are
philosophically fundamental for the idea of Natural Law deserve our attention.
The following are such fundamental verities. The human
mind recognizes the essence or the nature of things out of
which the order of the Universe presented in the Eternal
Law arises, so that man recognizes in the natures of created
things also the order of creation as a whole. Furthermore,
the essence of a thing is also its end; the causa formalis becomes in the process of production or self-realization of a
thing the causa finalis, the rule for acts which realizes the
idea, the nature of a thing. A created thing is the more perfect the fuller it "realizes" its idea; it has the more goodness, the more it is a realization of the idea or nature. Finally, the intellect is superior to the will in God as well as
in Men. The intellect recognizes the nature of created
things and the order of the universe, per analogiam and imperfectly, the Creator and His Eternal Law, by which the
order was created and is preserved. The natures and their
order, recognized by the intellect as "oughtness," as to be
realized by free acts of man, become then the rule of action for the will. St. Thomas points out frequently this interdependence of the ideas of Truth, objective order, and of
-Justice. For instance, he points out that the Justice of God
which constitutes the order among things in conformity to
God's Wisdom, which is the Law of the Order, may appropriately be called Truth (S. Th. I., qu. 21, a. 2). The natures of
the created things and the order in the Creation are thus in
the last analysis related to God's Intellect and Wisdom. Consequently this order, the Lex Aeterna and the Natural Law
which, by participation, is the same Lex Aeterna applied to
the free act of rational beings, is necessarily immutable. This
means that perjury or the killing of an innocent is always
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and under all circumstances wrong, that they are in themselves by nature wrong, not exclusively by the positive Will
of God or of a human legislator. Even God cannot make by
His omnipotent Will, by positive order, that right what is
by contradiction to God's Essence and Wisdom intrinsically
wrong, because this is metaphysically against God's very Essence. The Natural Law is, ergo, truly natural, i.e. a dictamen of Reason recognizing the intrinsic goodness or evil of
certain free acts, because they agree with or contradict nature and the natural order, and it is immutable as participation of the Lex Aeterna, which issues from God's Intellect
and Wisdom and rules the Creation.
Occam, the venerabilis inceptor, held that God is primarily absolute and omnipotent Will, and that the natures and
essences of things are not recognizable by man's intellect,
and consequently that the natural order of being, which belongs to practical reason, advising us what ought to be done
or omitted is not knowable to us. In God, so Occam says,
there cannot be any necessity; the decree of God, the Lex
Aeterna and the Lex Naturalis,do not issue necessarily from
the Essence of Him who promulgated them. For that would
make the absolute freedom and the absolute arbitrary omnipotent Will of God dependent on a superior necessity. All precedents of the Eternal and of the Natural Law are only absolutely arbitrary decrees of God's omnipotent Will. That
which Occam continues to call natural law is neither Natural
Law because it is arbitrarilyposited by God, nor is it immutable because God in His arbitrary infinite freedom could without any contradiction to His Wisdom and Goodness ordain
something wholly contradictory to the now posited natural
law, else God would not be wholly free and omnipotent. God
could, therefore, without inner contradiction ordain that the
created will hate Him and that this hatred should be meritorious (In. Sent. IV, qu. 14 D). Occam denies an intrinsic
goodness or evilness of a human act, such as the love of God
or the hatred of God.
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Occam, thus, in his metaphysics, has torn assunder God
and His Creation, insofar as he teaches that, besides God
being the external creative cause, there exists no intrinsic relation between God and the World, between God's Essence
and the moral order, the foundation of which is the general
analogia entis and the God-likeness of man. There is neither in man nor in the Creation a natural, a necessary and
fundamental order to God as the origin and as the ultimate
end of all being, which in its immutability would become for
the free rational being the ever-valid moral norm of its acts.
The absolute unity of Reason and Will in God is denied and
a "theological irrationalism" arises. The Natural Law is hollowed out in its substance though the term is still used, and
in its place steps a moral positivism, the doctrine that we
know what is right and wrong only sola fide.
We have long since given up the idea that the Reformation "errupted" so to speak, out of the Christian conscience
so crudely deceived by the superstitions of Romanism, so
ruthlessly violated by the arrogance of a power-hungry,
morally corrupt Curia. Many of the theological doctrines
which were espoused by the Reformers are only the ultimate
and ruthlessly drawn conclusions from the speculations and
discussions of the adherents of the via moderna in its two
branches: first Fideism, which means a crippling of natural
Theology and an utter weakening of the Praeambulafidei,
because human reason is not to be trusted, from which issues
the outspoken tendency towards positivism; second, a par-.
ticular form of mystical theology centered around the individual person, his religious experiences, his subjective longings culminating in the question: How do I find a merciful
God in the abyss of my essential sinfulness? The Reformers
rejected as superstitious, as pagan, the doctrine of the sacraments and the sacramentals, the hierarchical structure of
the Church, the Papal authority and that of Tradition, and
the Canon Law. Luther's public burning of the Corpus Juris
Canonid set him irrevocably on the road to "Protestantism."

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

The Catholic morality was, in their eyes, a despicable Pelagianism, with rules for a meritorious bargaining with God by
doing external good works, such as giving alms, fasting, indulgences, etc. To them the very essence of man under the
curse of original sin became the utter depravation of man's
nature. Our nature is wholly depraved, our will unable to
realize the good, our reason blind to truth. Nature is not
vulnerated or weakened by original sin; it is destroyed.
Nothing good remains in us. Of our God-given natural gifts
(donum naturale) remain only "deformed ruins." Thus from
the part of Theology the very foundations of the Natural
Law are denied, particularly the inner relation between the
Eternal Law and the Natural Law by reason of the participation and conformity of the Natural Law with the divine
revealed law as the Catholic tradition taught. As a consequence arises that significant dualism between the Kingdom
of God and the World, of the Spiritual and the Secular, which
Ernst Troeltsch has pointed out. Yet it would be foolish to
deny that the Reformers explicitly reject the Natural Law;
they do that as little as the Occamists did. They follow
rather the tradition, cite the Natural Law, use the term, and
only slowly, if at all, do they become aware that between the
Natural Law and their Theology there exists an irreconcilable contradiction. This is today a kind of opinio communis
of scholars in this field. The Reformers push this idea of the
Natural Law more and more into the background, just because of this contradiction between the Natural Law and
their Theology in the doctrines on the state and law, and use
the Bible and what they conceive the positive Divine Law
in the Bible as the basis of their political, juridical and moral doctrine. This is indirectly confirmed by the observation
that the Theology of Crisis and its founder, Karl Barth, who
wants to revive, as against the liberal Protestant Theology,
the original doctrine of the Reformers, vehemently attack
the idea of Natural Law as one basis of Christian ethics, and
instead recognize only the other basis, the revealed, that

THE NATURAL LAW

is, the positive, Divine Law. But if later the faith in the
Divine Law fades away by reason of Bible criticism and the
rise of deistic Rationalism, then the Divine Law as revealed
Law disappears and in Morality and Law remains only relativist positivism. This positivism produces then what Leo
XIII called the Modern Law emancipated from the Divine
Law, and deviating from the Christian and the Natural Law
(Immortale Dei). Yet he links that with the theory of participation of all laws, binds human law to the Natural Law, and
this to the Eternal Law, which may never be broken without
penalty. Furthermore, only in the personal God the absolute unity of His reason and of His will is upheld, and if tfle
intellect is superior to the will, can the conformity of the
Eternal Law and the Natural Law, of the revealed Divine
Law and of the Natural Law be accepted.
III
It was the providential task of the great Masters of the
second flowering of Scholasticism to reassert these fundamental verities against the Reformers and Occamism. They
were able to do so because they went back, as we said already, to St. Thomas, whom they revered as the Doctor Angelicus, and from whose doctrines they deviated only after
the most scrupulous research. They show this so salutary
combination of loyalty to St. Thomas and yet they possess a
personal independence which characterizes all the great philosophical schools in the history of the human mind. Consequently this revival of Scholasticism.is not a mere philological
one, so to speak; it is not a mere repetition of the tradition,
but a re-thinking and a renewal. Not only had the tradition
to be sifted and freed of obsolete matter, but new experiences and the new spirit of the era had to be assimilated insofar as it was possible, without the surrender of such doctrines as once and for all belong to the PhilosophiaPerennis.
In other words, the task of these Masters was, as the great
historian of Theology, Petavius, succinctly put it, to evolve
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what had been implicit and to develop fully what the Masters of the Middle Ages had left more in the stage of fundamental theses. Furthermore, they enriched the doctrine of
Natural Law in two directions: first, by refuting such subtle
attacks on its philosophical foundations as were espoused by
the Occamists, and had never been made before; and by this
refutation Suarez, Soto, Molina and Bellarmine had to enlarge the field of inquiry and of explication of all the parts of
the doctrine which had been scarcely touched before; secondly, they stood in their time before new problems that cried
for solutions, problems which, again, could not even have been
anticipated in the Middle Ages, such problems as in lus inter Gentes, the relations between pagan and Christian States,
the Divine Right theory of kings, etc., and in answering such
questions, they prepared the way for a further development
of Natural Law as the basis for the natural rights as they
have found their positive constitutional form in our modem
Bill of Rights.
Though they kept the proved and honored scholastic
method, they nevertheless show some distinctive methodological features which we do not yet find in the Middle
Ages. They are, so to speak, nearer to the concrete problems of their era; they are great controversialists, as the
works of Bellarmine and Suarez against the Divine Right
theory and Vittoria's treatises for the Indians so distinctly
show. In all these controversies they have to base their
arguments, to a great degree, on the Natural Law, as we will
see. They are, moreover, more history-conscious than the
Middle Ages were. This is caused by their stronger regard
for the Individual, the person as a secondary cause, that in
the World, in History, the field of contingent Being produces,
by its free decisions, by its free initiative under the Divine
and Natural Law, its civilization. That is no wonder, if we
imagine what an expansion of experience and learning had
taken place: the great discovery of the New World, the rise
of the nation-states and their national laws as against the Im-
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perium and its Civil Law stemming from the Romans, the
rise of international trade, the great religious controversies
caused by the Reformation, the danger to the Church universal by the rising national churches, the formation of a new
class, the lay "intelligentsia" so mightily furthered by the
Renaissance. All these produce, so to speak, a change in the
intellectual climate. The tendency to autonomy, to freedom from the -guardianship of the theologians in philosophy,
politics, literature and in the sciences and in secular culture
permeates this period. This need not mean enmity to the
Faith, to the Church-authority. But it means a new relation
between Church and State, between Community and person,
between contemplative and active life in the World. It means
a "weltzugewandte Frommigkeit," not flight from the world,
but Christian ethics for this new world of a more autonomous
political and cultural consciousness of the contemporaries. It
is significant of the more "personalist" tendency of this era
that the greatest controversy in theology is that of the relation between free Will and Grace, known better as the controversy between Thomists and Molinists.
The method of the Masters of the second flowering of
Scholasticism, compared to that of the Middle Ages, is more
empirical and, by reason of the great amount of knowledge
meanwhile accumulated, is comparative-analytical, as is appropriate to the contingent character of historical reality.
In our subject this means a more critical attitude towards existing sociaJ and political forms, an avoidance of the temptation to declare something as "natural" because it has been
accepted, without being questioned, for a long time. The institution of slavery is thus much more critically studied and
firmly rejected than was ever done in the Middle Ages. In
legal and political philosophy we find, for instance, that Suarez is not only concerned with a more accurate statement
of the relation between the common good and the private
good of the persons, but also with the limitations of the
human law. Thus he has already the doctrine against the ex
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posto facto law. Suarez makes one exception - provided
that the act is not a grave and imputable violation of the
first and generally known principles of the Natural Law
(cp. the juridical basis of the Nuernberg Trials in the matter
of Crimes against Humanity); in such a case a crime is recognized by all as such even without a positive law declaring
it a crime. The same tendency appears in the answer to the
question, whether the state can command an internal act and
punish for an internal act. The answer is that by its very nature the intimate sphere of the person is closed to the positive law which must and can be satisfied with the external
conformity to its law, and not with the internal motivation
of this conformity, for the human laws are concerned with
the external peace of the human commufnity. The comparative-analytical approach is obvious in every chapter of the
works of these Masters. They cite profusely not only the
Roman civil law, but also the laws of France, of Spain, of
Venice, of Florence, etc. When Molina studies the problems
of slavery, he tells us about the inquiries he made about the
Negro slave trade with ship owners and with traders, with
the port authorities and with the central authorities; he
cites the various pertinent documents in nine columns of his
De J stitiz et de lure. Vittoria tells us that he observed Indians and that he objected to the claim that they were barbarians and by nature slaves of the civilized Spaniard, by
pointing out to his opponents that there were many peasant-folk in Spain who were not more intelligent or well-bred
than these Indians, and yet nobody denied civil liberty to
these peasant folk.
This historical-analytical and comparative-empirical character of the method of the great Doctors explains why they
often give up the commentary, which was up to that time the
usual form of scholarly work. Instead they write their voluminous treatises "On the Laws" or "On Justice and the
Laws" in which they treat extensively and with great detail
the subject matter that St. Thomas treats in the nineteen
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quasstionesof the first part of the second volume of the Summa Theologka. The familiarity of the Doctors with the contemporary literature in civil and canon law, with the philosophers and theologians of the medieval era and of the following centuries is astonishing. On a question which one might
think St. Thomas had sufficiently or even exhaustively treated, we may find a multitude of new points of view. This
broadness does not produce a certain superficiality, as one
might suspect, but on the contrary, almost all scholars who
have studied the works of our Masters from Grotius on assert that they are of an amazing profundity and rich in fine
but well proved and scholarly distinctions. It is thus easily
comprehended that these works were used even in Protestant
Universities as textbooks and why they present truly encyclopedic works for the jurist and political philosopher of our
time, as is affirmed by such eminent scholars as Hauriou,
Mesnard, Barcia Trelles, del Vecchio, etc., and that they
represent one of the high-marks in the history of Natural
Law theory.
IV
Let us now discuss some of the particular themes which
occupied the minds of the Masters under the heading "Natural Law." One important result of their effort was the abolishment of the distinction between a primary Natural Law
as it existed before the Fall of Man and a second Natural
Law valid after that event. This theory goes back to the
stoic philosophy and the Roman Law and was upheld by the
Medieval Theologians. The stoics and the Roman Law used
it to find an explanation for some generally accepted social
institutions such as war, slavery, private property or the division of goods, with its implied injustices of the few wealthy,
and the many poor institutions, which could not be considered as just in the sense of the ideal Natural Law. The Roman jurists ascribed these institutions, e.g. slavery, to the
Jus Gentium, because according to the Natural Law all men
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are born free. The Jus Gentium is then a kind of secondary
Natural Law, which Reason has instituted and which all nations observe. In the Middle Ages the distinction served
partly for the same purposes; partly to save on the one hand,
the immutability of the Natural Law, and on the other hand
to explain certain sentences in the Scriptures, when God is
said to have ordered something which is against the Natural
Law. This distinction and the vague ambiguous character
of the Ius Gentium which contains, first, the conclusions
from the first principles of the Natural Law, second, those
positive legal institutions which the jurists found among all
or almost all nations at all times, and third, also the principal institutions of the international public law, is either given
up or freed from ambiguity. Suarez, for instance, declares
that all necessary conclusions from the Natural Law belong
to it and not the Ius Gentium. This is, according to Suarez,
proprie dictum, a general law of civilized nations ruling such
general legal matters as contracts, forms of properties, the legal division of property among men; it is in its character positive law and represents a general theory of such positive legal institutions which we find among almost all civilized nations because they have been instituted natura instigante.
But they are not of the Natural Law and they are not immutable either; for they are the product of human convention and of consent. From this Jus Gentium in the sense of
such a general law, common to civilized nations, Suarez distinguishes, then, the Jus Gentium in the strict sense as a Ius
inter Gentes, as the positive part of the public -international
law which rules the relations between nations as subjects-of
rights and duties, as members of the community of nations.
The positive law of war and peace, of legations and armistices, of international intercourse and trade is meant here, as
it was introduced by conventions, treaties and customs.
Quite evidently the Natural Law is valid for the relations
among nations also, and so is the Divine Law. Suarez is not
a positivist in the doctrine -of the Law of Nations.
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Suarez has no use for a distinction between the primary
and secondary Natural Law. The fall of man has not
changed the Natural Law as such, but has only added to the
political authority the compulsory power which it would not
have needed before the fall. The exegetical difficulties are
matters of exegesis, not of the Natural Law. The consequence
of the abandonment of this distinction is that such bothersome
institutions as forms of servitude, warfare, forms of government (Monarchy, as a more natural form of government)
are now all strictly institutions of positive human law and
therefore changeable. The right to conduct a just war in order to enforce one's rights may become obsolete by the introduction of an obligatory procedure of international arbitration. Slavery is now an imperfection of the human positive law and cannot any more be espoused as existing by nature, as we will show below. We may now understand why
a modem scholar (J. Kosters) says that after the labors of
Suarez, after his classification of fundamental concepts, the
fruits on the tree of international law were ripe for Grotius
to pluck. The Masters of the second flowering of Scholasticism are the actual founders of the modern theory of the
International Law, as Hugo Grotius himself admits, when he
speaks of the Magistri Hispanorum and the gratitude he
owes them for their pioneering work. He follows the Scholastics to a great degree and mentions their books on almost
every page of De Jure Belli ac Pace.
V
A very interesting application of the Natural Law in a
concrete situation is the criticism of the colonial method in
America by the Masters of the second flowering of Scholasticism. The espousers of the rather ruthless conquest of the
Americas by the Conquistadores were first attacked by the
missionaries sent to convert the Indians, under the leadership of Las Casas. This missionary bishop asked to have Vittoria as his theological consultant. Vittoria and almost all
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the other Doctors in their special treatises on the Indians
and on the Jus Belli, or in their general treatises "On Law
and Justice," treated broadly and with great care the moral
and juridicial issues in this burning problem. They all became
the defenders of the human dignity of the Indians and of
the independence of their states. One by one they tear to
pieces all the arguments of the espousers of that colonial imperialism and defend against these, the rights of the Indians
on the basis of the Natural Law. Sepulveda, a court theologian of the Spanish Monarchs, justified the conquest of the
Indian states and the brutal methods of colonization with
these theses: first, the Pope is the Supreme Lord of the World
a thesis, formed in the Middle Ages by the canonists or
curialists in their fight against the claims of the Emperor to
the supremacy of the World, that small world of Christendom and its arch-enemies, the Mohammedans-therefore the
Pope has the right, especially in order to spread the Christian Faith, to grant Christian Kings the political overlordship of the newly discovered Americas. The rulers of Spain
and Portugal consequently could claim to be the legitimate
sovereigns of these territories, their inhabitants and their
chieftains, with the promulgation of Alexander VI's edicts,
especially the edict Inter Ceteraof 1493. This "Donatio" by
the Pope was, of course, kept in the terms of the Feudal
Law; and it was the kings who applied to the Popes for the
"grant" of these territories as "fiefs" according to the Feudal Law. Nevertheless at that time the Feudal Law was already giving way to modern law of national sovereignty,
and the political meaning of the Edict was in the last analysis to establish the political sovereignty of the conquering
discoverers. Some theologians used the theocratic ideas of a
Henry of Segusia for the same purpose; the Pope, representing the Church, has received from God the Lordship of the
World for the Christianization of the World. By reason of
this divine authority, the Pope may appoint Christian kings
as legitimate political rulers over pagan nations. Another
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title to the same sovereignty was deduced from the medieval theory cast also in the formula of Feudal Law, that the
Emperor was the supreme lord of the world and that he consequently could grant these territories as fiefs of the Christian princes. A third claim was based on the right and duty
of Christian kings to suppress the pagan barbarism, the habitual blasphemies and the idolatry of the pagans, so offensive to God and His Christendom. Finally it was claimed
that the Christian civilized nations had by Natural Law according to Aristotle, and with the approval of St. Thomas
Aquinas, Duns Scotus and many other authorities, the right
to subject the Indians, because they were only "speaking
animals," because they were full of vices and bare of intellect and unable to rule themselves. They were, therefore,
by nature slaves and could, nay, ought to be subjected, in
their own interests, to the "Regimen despoticum" of Christian rulers. (Lest we judge too hard about these arguments,
let us remember that many of these were literally repeated
by the Puritans in New England against the Indians and by
the defenders of Negro slavery in the South.)
One by one the Masters tear these arguments to pieces.
The thesis so generally accepted in the Middle Ages, that
the Pope or the Christian Emperor is the Lord of the World
by divine institution or by succession to the Roman Emperor, is rejected and, instead, the so-called Natural Law theory
of the State, as St. Thomas had established it, though without drawing all the consequences of his time, is elaborated.
The state exists and the rulers rule by force of the Natural
Law. Man lived in true states before there was a Church
and a Pope. The rights and duties of rulers and ruled, because they follow from the Natural Law, are and remain independent of the State of Grace. Non eripit mortalia, qui
regna dat coelestia. In the Scriptures we find not one sentence by which it could be proved that Christ conferred any
political power on St. Peter or the Apostles; neither did
Christ exempt the Christians from the rule of pagan princes.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Referring to the famous Donatio Constantina, the Masters
assert that this is a spurious document of no value at all. By
Divine Law, the Pope is not Master of the World. Neither
is he that by Natural Law. By Natural Law, on the contrary, the pagan states of the Indians are fully sovereign
states. If the Pope claims any rights of intervention into the
internal affairs of these sovereign states, this claim must be
based on the Natural Law or on the Law of Nations. To
send armed forces into the lands of the Indians with the pretense that they only served to protect the missionaries is unlawful and would give these states a cause for a just war.
But what if the pagan sovereigns do not admit the missionaries or forcefully deport them? Then, say the Masters, the
Pope may appeal to Christian princes to compel the pagan
states to admit the missionaries. Why? Because the pagan
states were then violating a recognized rule of the Law of
Nations, they were in the wrong. For at that time it was
held that the rule of free travel, intercourse and sojourn in
the territories of the states was part of the Law of Nations
and thus established a right of the missionaries to sojourn
there and preach the Gospel. (Yet Las Casas would not even
accept this argument.) What is interesting here is that the
whole argument is based on the Natural Law and on the Law
of Nations, and that all claims based on the theocratic ideas
of the Curialists are simply shoved aside.
The same arguments apply to the thesis that the Emperor
is Lord of the World. The partisans of the Imperium Sacrum
held that the Christian Emperor is instituted by Christ as
ruler over Christendom, or that he gained the rule of the
World by translation of the Roman Empire or by succession
into the rights of the Old Roman Emperor, as the Jurist Bartolus, the famous post-glossator, tried to prove from Roman
Law, coming to the strange conclusion that he who denies
that the Emperor is Lord of the World, is certainly a heretic.
But the Masters argue that such claims are absurd; that they
are not based on any positive law, they are disproved by his-
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tory, which shows that even at the time of the Roman Emperor there existed independent states and certainly even at
the time of Bartolus, the East-Roman Byzantine Emperor
was sovereign and also the Kings of Spain and France have
been sovereign kings for centuries. We see that the medieval theocratic and empirical theories based on the CiUvitae
Dei of St. Augustine found no love with the Masters. In
addition, and thus crowning their arguments, by Natural
Law the Masters assert that the states of the Indians are as
perfect societies truly sovereign. They have their own laws
and constitutions, their courts and administrative offices. Any
attempt of the Emperor to enforce his specious overlordship
would grant the pagan states a cause for a just war of defense.
What of the pagan barbarism, the idolatry, the "unnatural" vices of the Indians as causes for conquest? In this
matter it is again interesting to observe that, if a right of intervention is at all acknowledged, this right is based rather
on the Natural Law and on the Law of Nations than on the
Canon Law. Some of the Masters make here a distinction between the Natural Moral Law and the Natural Juridical Law.
Idolatry, for instance, is a violation of the first, not of the
second. The temporal state does also not prohibit by its law
all vices and sins, but -

rightly -

only those which direct-

ly intervene in the protected sphere of another person and
those which endanger the proper end of the State, the common good. Similarly there exists no cause for the intervention of Christian States or for the Church on the basis of
Natural Law in the cases of idolatry and similar violations
of the moral law. But if the pagan rulers oppress their subjects who have been converted and if their emigration is not
feasible on account of their great number or they are forcefully hindered from doing so, or if the pagan priests perform human sacrifices, then, under due consideration of all
circumstances the Christian Princes would have an indubitable right to intervene by reason of the defense of Innocents,
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even by warfare. This right of intervention is based on the
Natural Law and on the nature of the community of nations,
which must demand of its members a minimum standard of
civilized morality; and it is significant that Molina expressly states that the Natural Law exclusively and not any papal authorization gives this right of intervention. Yet it is
interesting that this right of intervention for the defense of
Innocents was considered by some missionaries and by the
great Dominican Theologian Domingo de Soto as infeasible,
because it would make the spread of the Faith more difficult
or the ensuing war would cause much more suffering, i. e. the
use of the right of intervention would be unjust. In connection with this discussion, the Masters of the second flowering
cf Scholasticism have developed also their theory of the just
war which in some directions is an advancement over the
medieval doctrine. Since their doctrine is known generally,
let us only state that it is based again on the Natural Law
and was the basis of Hugo Grotius's doctrine of the just war.
VI
A most instructive application of the Natural Law may
be found in the criticism by the Masters of the Divine Right
theory. This theory, formulated in Byzantium, and espoused
later by the partisans of the medieval emperors, became
essential for the justification and the definite securing of absolute monarchy as against the theretofore unquestioned doctrine of the Divine Right of the Pope. In accord with the
religious spirit of the era of the Reformation and its theological irrationalism (inimical to the idea of Natural Law), it
seemed that only by a divine call could the rule of the princes
be firmly established. Political authority, whether it were
the monarchy of which Luther spoke, or the aristocracy of
the virtuous predestined viri egregii, after the example of
the men described in the Book of Judges, as Calvin taught,
by reason of the decomposition of the Natural Law by the
reformist theology, had to be based on a divine act of institu-
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tion. Furthermore, the Protestant prince had to become also
the Summus Episcopus; he had to unite in his hands the
supreme temporal and spiritual authority. The democratic
ideas of ecclesiastical constitution which were to characterize
the non-conformists were not yet developed.
The Divine Right theory served two ends: first, it gave
the prince an originary power independent of and unlimited
by any covenant with the estates representing the people;
second, it established the prince as the sovereign spiritual
authority as against the national Hierarchy and, particularly,
the Pope. Dei gratiameant "neither by the people's, nor by
the Pope's, grace." These ideas, in a somewhat attenuated
form, were prevalent in the Catholic monarchies. Nevertheless, it was also affirmed that the office of the prince is immediately instituted by God - like the office of the Pope;
although to the Pope, concurrently with ecumenical councils,
belongs the supreme doctrinal authority, to the prince belongs the jurisdictional and administrative authority in the
Church of the Realm. The prince has exclusively the constituent power in his realm, and any participation by the estates, or by the people, is thinkable only by an arbitrarily revocable grant of the prince. This implies that there is no
room for an active or a passive right to resistance based on
Natural Law. Only meek obedience is the duty of the citizens, at least as long as the prince does not openly act against
the Scriptures - that is, as long as he does not become a
"heretic." Against the heretical prince the orthodox must,
of course, rise in arms. (In connection with this it is interesting to compare the Thomistic doctrine that the theological heresy of the prince as such does not destroy the mutual
rights and duties of authority and citizens based on Natural
Law, at least as long as the concrete political common good
is not directly affected by the heresy of the prince.) If the
Natural Law is to be considered of any value, then the prince
is to be considered the sole and sovereign interpreter of it
because his authority is of directly divine institution. As
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Hobbes expressed it: a law of the prince may be iniquitous,
but "it is not unjust," because the Natural Law, in Hobbes'
view, is actually wholely immersed in the positive law of the
Leviathan, and, therefore, it becomes a meaningless term.
Among the consequences of this were the nefarious principle
of "Cujus ,egio, ejus religio," the theoretical impossibility of
any form of civil tolerance; the identification of political and
ecclesiastical religious loyalty, which issued in the ruthless
oppression of religious non-conformists because politically
they committed treason by their religious heterodoxy.
Against this Divine Right theory arose the great Doctors
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to develop more
fully the Thomistic Natural Law theory of the State and of
political authority. The State, they taught, is an institution
of the Natural Law. Man is by nature a political being. The
State as the natural "perfect society" is in its institution and
jurisdiction independent of Grace and Supernature. Furthermore, though founded in human nature and therefore
necessary for its most perfect realization, the concrete State
comes into existence not without the intervention of free human acts. That is, the concrete State is to be thought to
come into existence by a consent, by a covenant, by a social
contract of the "family-fathers" who instigante natura see
the necessity to form a more perfect union. The juridical
figure of a pact, a true status contract, will signify not so
much that an historically documented solemn covenant has
been formally concluded, but that free human acts have produced the State, not a divine interventive act. Furthermore,
with the initial formation of the however-rudimentary body
politic, political authority, ultimately deriving from God as
the Creator of human political nature, rests immediately
with the body politic, which is, therefore, an immediate democracy. Any other form of government, such as representative democracy or monarchy, must consequently be considered as produced by a distinct act of the body politic; i. e.,
of the people in the political sense - by an act of transfer
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of political authority. There is no intrinsic reason why this
or that person should have by nature a right to political authority since all the partners in the original covenant are free
and equal. This does not invalidate the duty of the covenantors to give up the immediate democracy and to institute
a different form of government, a monarchy, for instance, by
consent in the interest of the more perfect and more efficient
realization of the common good.
But it is clear that all forms of government are derived
from an original constituent power of the people. Even
though it is indisputable that political authority is ultimately
derived from God, immediately it is derived from the people.
Consequently, all political forms of government - and absolute monarchy, too - are merely creatures of positive,
man-made law: not of the Natural Law - and even less of
positive, divine law, as the Divine Right theory taught. Demonstration of the validity of the Divine Right theory would
require a revealed act of God, of which there is no historical
record. Even the rule of Saul and David, so often cited as
examples by the Divine Right theorists, is not acceptable to
St. Robert Bellarmine as being instituted directly by God.
Since all constitutions, all forms of government, are of
positive man-made law only, they are all "limited" by the
Natural Law. Every consensual act of transfer of political
authority to a person or to a group of persons contains as an
unconditional clause: salvo jure naturale- and, consequently, salvis jeibus naturalibus. The legitimacy of political
power rests, in the last analysis, upon its service to the common good, because the right to the realization of the common
good is also an inalienable right of the people. From this it
follows that the people have by Natural Law the right to active and passive resistance, first, against the usurpator,and,
second, against the tyrannus secundum egimen; i. e., the
initially legitimate ruler who gravely violates the common
good.
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The twin concepts of the limitation of political authority
and the right of the people to resist tyranny form, by the
way, the content of medieval constitutionalism, which rested on three principles: first, the Law is supreme, rather than
the king or the estates of the realm separately acting - this
is the theory of the supremacy of the Law, Legem servare
hoc est regnare ...; second, the principle that the Law issues
from a kind of co-operation between the royal authority and
the estates, the former having the right of legislative initiative and the latter, by their consent, limiting the initiative
of the king through the public sense of justice that animates
the people; third, the principle that the people or the estates
have a right to resist an act of the king violating the Law as
a "pactum," a "covenant," a "constitutio," contracted by the
king and the people and binding, therefore, each of them
equally. If the king acted against the pactum, then the legitimacy of the act (and even of the authority of the king)
was destroyed. This pattern of thinking was especially valid
if the act of the king was against the Natural Law. That
meant also that the king could not infringe upon the solemnly
established and agreed upon Liberties and Immunities of the
estates, the cities and the towns, the guilds, and other communities from which were then derived the rights of the individual according to the community spirit of the Middle
Ages.
Thus it is significant that against the theory of the Rex
legibus solutus, against the Divine Right theory, which made
of the king a "Pro-Deus" (Bacon), a "Deus mortalis"
(Hobbes), and made consequently an appeal against an act
of the king impossible, since there is no appeal against a divinely instituted authority, the Masters established, besides
the existing positive constitutional law, the Natural Law as
the basis of an appeal against the tyrannical ruler. Seditio,
i.e., unlawful rebellion against legitimate (in the formal and
in the material sense) government was clearly distinguished
from the right to active as well as passive resistance, that is,
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lawful revolution. The similarity of the arguments of the
Masters of the second flowering of Scholasticism to the arguments of the Declaration of Independence is so evident that
it need not be elaborated on.
VII
Still another characteristic feature of the development of
Natural Law doctrine during the second flowering of Schor
lasticism - and this in a certain consonance with the spirit
of the Christian Renaissance and with eighteenth-century
theories of human rights - is the elaboration of the concepts
of the JuraNaturalia,especially those of liberty and property. What was contained implicitly in the thought of St.
Thomas was made explicit in the writings of this period. It is
true that such a nominalist as Occam in his day stressed the
fact that the Jura Naturalia were subjective rights existing
in consequence of the objective norm. The term Jus for St.
Thomas, meant primarily the objective Justum, the Law,
and very seldom did he mean by it the subjective right as it
was known to the Roman Law. But for Occam Jus becomes
"Potentas licita actum aliquem exercendi"; and, significantly, Occam singles out -Liberty as such a Potestas, natural to
man as a person. This natural right of Liberty may not be
taken away from man without "guilt" or reasonable cause
against his will, though man may voluntarily give up his Liberty. Occam, thus, has quite clearly the idea of Natural
Rights; and this is easily understood if we are aware that the
most positive among the many negative features of Nominalism was its interest in the individual generally and in the
human personal will as a creative cause of human political
and cultural life.
The theory of the Natural Rights of the person and of the
State finds its full "explication" in the century from Vittoria
to Bellarmine. Vittoria points out - in his defense of the
Indians against the theses of Sepulveda, who espoused a
rather ruthless colonial imperialism, that the Indians, as per-
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sons and as citizens of independent states, are not by nature
slaves or subjects of civilized Christian nations. When
Sepulveda cites the famous Aristotelean thesis that some are
by nature slaves, Vittoria tries to excuse Aristotle by pointing out that Aristotle only means that those who by virtue
of high intellectual gifts are capable of ruling themselves are
shown thereby to be capable of ruling those of "brawny
bodies." But Aristotle does not mean, according to Vittoria,
that what Jefferson was later to call "the natural aristocracy"
has a natural right to rule as masters those of weaker minds
and lower civilization, who by nature are destined to slavery.
Slavery was not conceived by Vittoria as an institution allowed by Natural Law, not even of a secondary Natural Law
(as taught by the Stoics and the Medieval Scholastics, who
held that slavery was immoral in the status naturaepuraethat is according to primary Natural Law - but excusable
as a consequence of sin - according to the secondary Natural Law). For Vittoria slavery as a hereditary status of servitude is exclusively Jure Humano; it is not even an institution of the Jus Gentium - that somewhat vague medium between the Jus Naturale and the Jus Civile. When Vittoria
discusses monarchy, which he prefers- to other forms of government in accordance with the scholastic tradition (though
we should be quite clear that monarchy does not mean to him
the hereditary absolute monarchy of the seventeenth century), he stresses that Liberty is as well, nay, better, protected under monarchy, the clearly circumscribed and stable
rule of one, than under the rule of the few or the many. This
idea of Liberty as a right to be best protected under monarchy is new. Before Vittoria, the argument for monarchy
was taken from the idea of the objective order requiring an
objective authority of one will to protect its own stability;
with Vittoria, the argument for monarchy flows from his concept that under monarchy the Liberty of the subject is best
protected.
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From Vittoria on, the theory of Liberty as a natural right
of persons and of the State is developed further concomitantly with the argument against servitude. The distinction between the primary Natural Law and the secondary is abandoned: the Fall of Man is no longer considered to have any
influence upon the core of Natural Law. The Jus Gentium
becomes, on the one hand, a positive general Law of civilized
nations, an "ailgemeines Kulturrecht"; and, on the other
hand, it becomes a Jus inter Gentes, the positive part of the
Law of Nations. If, thus, Liberty is a right based on the
Natural Law, then all forms of servitude are products of
merely human law with its imperfections. Aristotle's argument about slavery as an hereditary status of servitude is. declared unacceptable and absurd. Suarez, for instance, stresses
that personal 'Liberty belongs positively to Natural Law,
that it is a natural v'ight, because man as a rational, free being
has a natural dominium over his Liberty. Liberty can be lost
only by free and voluntary surrender or "ex justa causa";
i. e., as a punishment for crimes (and it is significant that
Suarez continues - just as the State may take away the life
of a criminal according to just criminal law). As the life of
an innocent man is sacred, so also is his Liberty. For like
life, so is Liberty given to each man by the Creator Himself;
and by nature all are free and equal. These ideas are applied also to the State as a personamoralis. The State is by
nature a Free State, with the right of self-determination. The
constituent members establish by the social pact, primaeva
institutione, an immediate democracy: this original democracy ought ordinarily transform itself, by constitutional positive act, into a monarchy, absolute or limited; into an aristocracy; or into an indirect representative democracy. All
forms of government are, consequently, of positive historical
law. There is no Divine Right of Kings; or of Democratic
Majorities.
Similarly, States have a natural right to Liberty and independence from one another under Natural and International
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Law. Therefore, the great Doctors of this period reject all
the arguments of the defenders of colonial imperialism with
the counter-argument that the pagan States of the Indians
are by Natural Law free and independent, and that all claims
of the Spanish must be based only on the International Law
of the community of nations.
It is significant that property and the natural right to
property are treated similarly to Liberty. True, the Masters
of that time did not need to treat these problems as widely
and profoundly as they required to be treated in the nineteenth century under the impact of Marxist Socialism. Yet
the question arose in connection, again, with the rights of the
Indians. These have, so the Doctors said, a true dominium
of their properties, real and movable; to take away their
properties would be a violation of Natural Law. Suarez also
criticized the doctrine of some jurists who asserted that the
temporal king could, by reason of his absolute power, arbitrarily transfer the property of one man to another, or confiscate it. This, declared Suarez, is "absurdissima" and also
against the natural right that everybody has to his legitimate
property. Suarez and others also taught that the division of
goods (i. e., private property as a legal institution) is not
a consequence of sin, but is convenient to nature and might
have been introduced even in the status naturae purae.
Under the influence of natural reason, private property was
introduced among all civilized nations, and everyone has now
the natural right to his property as he has the right to the
fruits of his labor.
An interesting sidelight on this positive evaluation of Liberty is afforded by a short discussion of the ideas on economic
liberty and monopoly held by these Masters of the Scholasticism's second flowering. The main problem has always
been: under what conditions will the prices of goods and
services be just? Under what conditions will they be what
they should be, according to Natural Law? Will prices have
the best chance to be justly established under conditions of a

THE NATURAL LAW

free market and under the rules of ordered free competition?
Or is it necessary that the government regulate the prices and
exchanges in order to assure just prices? And how far are
monopolies, private and public, permissable, which by their
own economic power can control prices?
Among the many theologians who have treated of these
problems from the points of view of ethics and the Natural
Law, Molina stands out particularly. In his remarkable
book, De Justitiaet de Jure,he demands, first, that economic
exchanges must follow the rules of commutative justice the equality of value and price; and, secondly, that the just
price is not influenced by the economic status of persons as
exchangers, but is determined absolutely through such factors
as costs, supply and demand, which altogether represent the
"natural price" under due consideration of the changes in the
"value" of money. Molina held that the natural (i. e., the
just) price has the greatest chance to be the actual market
price under conditions of a free exchange market and stability of money. Regulated prices have much less chance to
be just prices, because Government regulation cannot meet
the frequent changes that take place among the determining
factors of the natural price. He condemns private monopolies
as usurpations and enslavements of the free market in contradiction to the Natural Law. He accepts regulation of prices
only in emergency situations and rejects them as ordinary
means of directing economic life by the State. State monopolies are accepted on the condition that they serve the common good, because they may be considered as a source of public revenue; but they must never serve private interests in
the form of privileges. If the Kin'g therefore grants, for reasons of the common good, certain merchants' associations or
craftsmen's guilds, e. g. printers, monopoly privileges, then
the prices must be regulated in harmony with the Natural
Law principle of the just price. Molina's views thus show,
in accordance with the general tendency, a highly positive
evaluation of Liberty in the economic exchanges in a free
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market, as a natural condition for the realization of the just
price. This positive attitude toward ordered Liberty in economic life is further accentuated by his strong criticism of
unfair monopolistic practices and by his diffidence toward
Government controlled markets and prices.
VIII
After this survey, which by its very nature is sketchy and
cannot be considered at all comprehensive, it is easy to understand why so eminent a jurist and scholar as Joseph Kohler, professor at .the University in Berlin, who, recognizing
the insufficiency of legal positivism, consequently had delved
into the Natural Law Tradition, could write in 1916 that a
revival of Natural Law must return to the thought of the
Masters of the second flowering of Scholasticism, and not to
Hugo Grotius and the Rationalists. It is the tragedy of the
rationalist Natural Law as it developed on the European
continent that it ultimately served only as political ideology
and propaganda able to attack the Ancien Rgime and to
produce the Revolution and the Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen and then be drowned in the TerrorRegime of the Jacobines, or to be 'forgotten by rising nationalism and the general positivism which got control of the universities and of the courts. The Common Law countries have
been luckier, at least to a degree. In its tradition and under
the influence of the clerics of the Chancery, the idea of a Natural Law was better preserved than on the European continent. This tradition was protected by the judges who mostly
felt that they were intrusted with the Law and the administration of justice; they held in the majority that Law is
reason, right reason; that is, positive law must be in agreement with the Natural Law and with natural Justice and
Equity. Though there are not absent dark pages in the history of the Common Law, it remains true that all through the
centuries, the tradition of Natural Law never was fully abandoned in the history of the Common Law. It was the judges
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who, animated by the Natural Law, took on the guardianship
of the Law as a Rule of Reason and for reasonable free citizens, against absolutist kings and the thread of tyrannical
majorities in the legislatures. Jurists and judges who are
philosophically mere pragmatists and positivists cannot be
the guardians of the Natural Rights because they have abandoned the sources from which these rights and their dignity
are simultaneously derived; the Natural Law.
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